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THE TRINITY: RELATIVE IDENTITY REDUX

1

H . E. Baber

Prima facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for the doctrine of the
Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each of
which is a Trinitarian Person, are the same G o d (or Being) but not the same
Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions to logic puzzles concerning
the doctrine of the Trinity have not, in recent years, been much pursued.
Critics worry that relative identity accounts are unintuitive, uninformative
or unintelligible. 1 suggest that the relative identity account is worth a sec¬
ond look and argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of
the Trinity.

According to relative identity theories it is possible for objects x and y to
be the same F but not the same G—where F and G are sortals, and x and y
are Gs as well as Fs. P r i m a facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for
the doctrine of the Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and
H o l y Spirit, each of w h i c h is a Trinitarian Person, are the same G o d (or
Being) but not the same Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions
to logic puzzles concerning the doctrine of the Trinity have not, i n recent
years, been m u c h pursued. Critics worry that relative identity accounts
are unintuitive, uninformative or unintelligible—and, i n addition, that
the most plausible relative identity theories do not circumvent the logical
problems that that the doctrine of the Trinity poses.
I suggest that the relative identity account is worth a second look and
argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of the Trinity. 1n
the first section, 1 consider van Inwagen's relative identity account. 1n the
second, 1 discuss Trenton Merrick's response, according to w h i c h accounts
like van 1nwagen's should be rejected because relative identity is itself un¬
intelligible. Relative identity theories, particularly those of the Geachean
variety according to w h i c h absolute identity statements are ill-formed, are
indeed problematic. 1 ague, however, that Merricks has misidentified the
problems and has not shown that relative identity accounts of the Trinity
doctrine should be rejected.
Relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine, like van 1nwagen's,
provide a basis for licensing the inferences we want and avoiding those
•1 a m grateful to Peter v a n Inwagen and other participants at the 2014 Society of Christian
Philosophers meeting at w h i c h 1 presented an earlier version of this paper, to L i l a Luce, and
to the anonymous referee for this journal for comments.
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that are incoherent or theologically objectionable. Most importantly, they
are metaphysically innocent and theologically noncommittal. This, arguably, is a virtue rather than a vice: whereof we cannot speak, thereof we
must remain silent.
I
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is widely held by critics to be logi¬
cally incoherent insofar as it is committed both to the distinctness of divine
Persons—Father, Son, and H o l y Spirit—and to monotheism. According to
the Trinity doctrine, each of the Persons is G o d . But assuming that there
is just one G o d , it seems to follow that Father, Son and H o l y Spirit are
identical—insofar as we understand identity as the counting relation. So
we appear committed to
(1) The Father = The Son
However, since we assume that the Persons are distinct we seem com¬
mitted to (2) as well:
(2) The Father^The Son
A n d so we have a contradiction.
One way of avoiding contradiction is by eschewing the language of
strict identity. O n relative identity accounts, w h i c h adopt this strategy, com¬
mitment to monotheism and to the distinctness of Trinitarian Persons is
held to entail (3) and (4) rather than (1) and (2):
(3) The Father is the same Being as the Son
(4) The Father is not the same Person as the Son
Predicates of the f o r m is the same F as , where F is a sortal term,
are RI (relative identity) predicates: Statements i n w h i c h they figure, like
(3) and (4), are relative identity (RI) statements. Relative identity accounts
of the Trinity replace absolute identities w i t h relative identity statements.
However replacing absolute identity statements (1) and (2) w i t h relative
identity statements is no improvement if such statements "split u p " into
property ascriptions and identities, as they do on the standard analysis of
relative identity statements:
2

Standard Analysis: "x is the same F as y" should be understood to say
"x is an F and y is an F and x = y."
O n this account, we should understand (3) and (4) as (3') and (4') re¬
spectively:
(3') The Father is a Being and the Son is a Being and the Father = the Son

2

A sortal is generally understood to be a count n o u n that conveys (or borrows) a criterion for identity. M o s t importantly for the current discussion, it is substantival rather than
adjectival.
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(4') N o t (the Father is a Person and the Son is a Person and the Fa¬
ther = the Son)
Since the Father and Son are Persons, (4') implies that the Father ^ the Son,
so the contradiction is back. G i v e n the standard analysis, it is not possible
that the Father be the same Being as the Son but not the same Person. M o r e
generally, given the standard analysis, for any x, y, and any sortals, F, G, it
is not possible that x be the same F as y but not the same G as y.
A l l relative identity theories are incompatible w i t h the standard analysis
of relative identity statements because every relative identity theory is
committed to
R: it is possible for objects a and b to be the same F but not the same G, where
(i) F and G are substantival predicates, designating kinds, rather than adjectival predicates and (ii) a is an F, b is an F, a is a G and b is a G .

Where a predicate F is adjectival, "a is the same F as b" is not a relative
identity statement and so does not, on anyone's account, "break d o w n " into
"a is an F and b is an F and a = b." M y toothbrush is the same color as the
Golden Gate Bridge but not the same shape. This is poses no problems for
the standard analysis of identity since identity, at least the identity of partic¬
ulars, does not enter into the picture. R, however, says that it is possible that
individuals be the same F but not the same G where F and G are substantival
predicates, so that "a is the same F as b" is a relative identity statement and
"a is not the same G as b" is the denial of a relative identity statement.
Secondly, R says that it is possible for individuals to be the same F but
not the same G i n non-trivial cases. O n anyone's account M a r k Twain is
the same person as Samuel Clemens but not the same number as Samuel
Clemens because M a r k Twain, a.k.a. Samuel Clemens, is not a number.
Such cases are compatible w i t h the standard analysis, according to
w h i c h " M a r k Twain is the same number as Samuel Clemens" says that
M a r k Twain is a number and Samuel Clemens is a number and M a r k
Twain = Samuel Clemens. That is false—not because the identity fails but
because the first two conjuncts are false. 1n general, the standard analysis
allows that a and b be the same F but not the same G i n such trivial cases,
where a and b are neither the same G nor different Gs, because they are not
Gs at all. R, however, says that even where a and b are Gs, they may never¬
theless be the same F but not the same G—that they may be the same F but
different Gs. So, once again, R is incompatible w i t h the standard analysis.
Every relative identity theory assumes R. Some accounts, notably the
relative identity theory originally proposed by Geach, reject absolute
identity outright. These accounts, i n addition to R, affirm
D: Statements of the f o r m "x = y" are incomplete and therefore i l l formed. A proper identity statement has the f o r m "x is the same F as y . "
3

3

M i c h a e l Rea, "Relative 1dentity and the Doctrine of the Trinity," in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: O x f o r d University Press, 2009), 253. Rea cites Geach, but
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Others admit statements of the f o r m "x = y" but deny that relative iden¬
tity statements are reducible to them. Either way, relative identity theories
reject the standard analysis of relative identity statements: on all such
accounts, sortal-relative identity relations are not reducible to property
ascriptions plus absolute identity.
1f the standard analysis of relative identity statements is rejected, then
(3) does not cash out as (3'), so it is not clear that (3) entails that the Fa¬
ther = the Son or, hence, that it is inconsistent w i t h (4). But this, by itself,
does not show the doctrine of the Trinity to be coherent. Even if (3) and (4)
do not assert the identity and distinctness of Trinitarian Persons respec¬
tively, they may nevertheless be inconsistent i n virtue of the meanings of
the relative identity predicates " is the same Being as " and " is the
same [Trinitarian] Person as
." R says only that there are some relative
identity predicates, being the same F and being the same G, such that it is
possible that x and y be the same F but not the same G . 1t does not say (ab¬
surdly) that this is the case for all relative identity predicates. Moreover,
it is an extra-logical matter which predicates behave i n this way: clearly a
great many relative identity predicates do not. 1t is surely not possible for
x and y to be the same dog but not the same animal—at least not i n English
or i n orthodox biological theory.
For a relative identity defense of the Trinity doctrine, it is not enough
to invoke R, w h i c h says only that some substantival predicates, F, G, allow
for things being the same F but not the same G. We need to show that Being
and Person can reasonably be understood to be such predicates. To do this,
van 1nwagen, w h o has argued that relative identity can be exploited to
develop a logically consistent account of the Trinity, provides an account
of the difference between those pairs of relative identity predicates that
allow same-F-different-G and those that do not i n terms of the relative
dominance relations amongst predicates:
Dominance: [A]n R1-predicate I dominates a predicate F (F m a y be of any
polyadicity and be either ordinary or R1) if all sentences of the f o r m "1ap
^ (F^a < >
p)" are true. We say that an R1 predicate that dominates
every predicate is dominant.
4

R1 predicates may dominate other R1 predicates. " is the same F as "
dominates " is the same G as
" if being the same F entails being the
same G. Dominant R1 predicates dominate all R1 predicates, so if " is the
same H as " is dominant, then being the same H entails being the same F
for all sortals F. O n this account, domination may be mutual, so it is pos¬
sible that being the same F dominate being the same G and vice versa. Indeed,
to reject R is precisely to hold that all R1 predicates are dominant—that
is, that for all x, y and sortals F, G, x is the same F as y if and only if x is
without any page numbers. 1've looked through several papers by Geach but haven't f o u n d
the exact quote.
4

Peter V a n 1nwagen, " A n d Yet They A r e N o t Three Gods but One G o d , " i n Philosophical
and Theological Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: O x f o r d University Press, 2009), 231.
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the same G as y, where x is an F and y is an F and x is a G and y is a G. To
embrace R is to hold that some predicates are not dominant.
According to the standard analysis, every relative identity predicate
dominates classical identity: that is to say, for all sortals F, if x is the same
F as y, then x = y. This is what relative identity theories deny. According
to any relative identity theory, there are some R1 predicates that do not
dominate classical identity. Van 1nwagen's defense of the Trinity doctrine
relies on the assumption that the R1 predicate __is the same Being as__,
w h i c h figures i n (3), is not dominant—and i n particular, that it does not
dominate __is the same Person as__ . 1f that is correct, then we cannot infer
f r o m (3), according to w h i c h the Father and the Son are the same Being,
that they are the same (Trinitarian) Person. A n d if this is so, then (3) and (4)
are consistent and so the doctrine of the Trinity can be coherently stated.
Relative identity, however, is at least m i l d l y disreputable: it is, as H a r r y
Deutsch notes, a "maverick" v i e w that presents "a serious challenge to
the received, absolutist doctrine of identity." Critics worry that relative
identity is unintuitive, unintelligible and uninformative, and that it is, at
least i n its Geachean form, committed to some objectionable f o r m of antirealism. Some objections to relative identity solutions to the Trinity puzzle
therefore are, more broadly, objections to relative identity. So some critics,
including Trenton Merricks, hold that because relative identity is i n and
of itself objectionable, it is a non-starter for any account of the Trinity. 1
suggest that relative identity is i n good order and provides a logically
coherent account of the Trinity doctrine.
5

6

II
Trenton Merricks argues that relative identity is unintelligible and has
consequences that are false:
[P]retend for a moment that the thesis of relative identity is true. So let's pretend, for example, that being the same dog as does not entail being the same as
(i.e. being identical with). But then we must admit that we have no idea what
the relation of being the same dog is supposed to be. A n d it seems that all al¬
leged "relative identity relations" are likewise unintelligible.
7

Relative identity does not, however, block intuitively correct inferences.
If being the same dog dominates identity, then the entailment goes through—
it just doesn't go through by the logic of identity alone, but rather depends

5

H a r r y Deutsch, "Relative 1dentity," Stanford Encyclopedia
.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/.

of Philosophy, 2007, http://plato

6

For an exploration of the logics of relative identity, axiomatized b y means of sound and
complete sequent calculi see Pawel Garbacz, "Logics of Relative 1dentity," Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic 43 (2002), 27-50.
7

Trenton Merricks, "Split Brains and the G o d h e a d , " i n Knowledge and Reality: Essays
in Honor of Alvin Plantinga on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Thomas M . C r i s p , Matthew D a v i d s o n , and D a v i d Vander Laan (Kluwer A c a d e m i c Publishers, 2006). 1 retrieved this paper
f r o m https://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/merricks/files/2010/05/The-Godhead.pdf. The page
number f r o m that version of the paper is p. 5.
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on the character of the R1 predicate being the same dog. Even for Geachstyle relative identity accounts, w h i c h reject classical identity, there are
still ample entailments given that being the same dog is dominant, so that
for every available predicate F, where x and y are Fs, x is the same dog as y,
entails that x is the same F as y. A s s u m i n g D, we cannot of course infer that
x = y. 1ndeed, as Merricks notes, we cannot say that anything is absolutely
identical w i t h itself since on such an account the absolute identity predi¬
cate is not available. However, if x is a dog, we can infer that x is the same
dog as x. A n d , since dog is dominant, if x is the same dog as y, we can infer
that x is the same animal as y. We can infer also that if x is brown, weighs
seventy pounds and prefers chasing cats to chasing cars, the same is true
of y. We have everything else non-philosophers, w h o rarely use the lan¬
guage of absolute identity, could want. G i v e n the richness of entailments,
it is hard to see what more could be needed for intelligibility: even if we
don't have absolute identity, for all practical purposes, sortal dominance is
just as good. Merricks has not shown that without absolute identity being
the same dog or any other relative identity predicates are "unintelligible."
Merricks, however, is even less sympathetic to what he styles "attenu¬
ated" relative identity theories, w h i c h admit absolute identity, and does
not think they provide an acceptable account of Trinitarian claims.
The attenuated relative identity theorist says that identity is relative only
w i t h respect to the Trinity . . . so being the same God as, besides being u n defined, turns out to be unlike paradigm cases of being the same F as, all of
w h i c h involve absolute identity. 1n light of this, the objection that relative
identity relations are unintelligible is even more compelling.
8

A g a i n , it is hard to get a grip on this objection. The difference between
being the same God and what Merricks takes to be paradigmatic R1 predi¬
cates is that being the same God is not dominant and, i n particular, that it
does not dominate being the same (Trinitarian) Person. But it does dominate
a range of other predicates, e.g., being omnipotent, being omniscient, and
being the same Being. 1f the Father is the same G o d as the Son, it follows that
the Father is omnipotent if and only if the Son is omnipotent, that the Fa¬
ther is omniscient if and only if the Son is omniscient and, for that matter,
that the Father is G o d if and only if the Son is G o d . Being the same God
does not however dominate being the same Person or any of the hypostatic
predicates that are characteristic of Trinitarian Persons individually. The
Father is the same G o d as the Son, but it does not follow that the Father
is the same Trinitarian Person as the Son, or that the Father was crucified
if and only if the Son was crucified, or that the Father begets the Son if
and only if the Son begets the Son, or that the Son is begotten but also
unbegotten, insofar as the Father is unbegotten. Since being the same God
does not dominate being crucified, being begotten, and a range of other hypostatic predicates, a relative identity account can avoid Patripassionism, the

8

M e r r i c k s , "Split Brains and the G o d h e a d , " 8.
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doctrine that the Father suffered on the Cross, and a variety of other
heresies and incoherent theological doctrines.
Dominance
This account, however, poses a question: what induces dominance? Prima
facie it seems that, without some principled way of determining dominance
relations amongst predicates, this solution to the Trinity puzzle is, at best,
ad hoc. To solve the puzzle, we announce that Being does not dominate
Person but rather that Person dominates Being—hence that Father, Son and
H o l y Spirit are the same Being but not the same Person. Without some prin¬
cipled way of accounting for dominance, the objection runs, this seems no
more than an unsubstantiated assertion. 1f Person dominates Being but not
vice versa, what makes that so?
This is, however, asking too much: dominance is theory-relative. The
best we can do is give a principled account of dominance in a theory since,
according to relative identity accounts, it is the resources of the theory i n
w h i c h sortal relative identity statements figure that determine dominance
relations and license inferences. Theories are linguistic entities and domi¬
nance is a grammatical category. There is no dominance, i n the relevant
sense, i n the order of nature: i n extra-linguistic reality, things can no more
be dominant than they can be nominative or dative. Moreover, enriching
a theory w i t h additional predicates that allow for finer distinctions is
metaphysically innocuous: Geach's aim i n introducing the Relative 1dentity Thesis was precisely to avoid the repugnant conclusion that ideology
drives ontology. Geach complains that Quine's criterion for ontological
commitment, because it assumes absolute identity, does just this:
[A]s our knowledge expands we should unhesitatingly expand our ideol¬
ogy, our stock of predicables, but should be more w a r y about altering our
ontology. . . . A n admirable aim; but one that we cannot attain by Quine's
device of reading strict identity into 1-predicables.
9

Relative identity, to this extent, "leaves everything as it is."
Consider a stock case i n w h i c h we might say that different passengers
are the same person, e.g., that the occupant of Seat 6a on last week's flight
to Baltimore is a different passenger f r o m the occupant of Seat 17c on today's
flight to San Diego, but the same person. Airline Theory is rich enough to
distinguish between the occupants of those seats because its predicates in¬
clude seat designators and the relation of legal seat occupancy. People are
the same passenger if and only if they legally occupy the same seat on the
same flight; therefore, 6a to Baltimore and 17c to San Diego are the same
person but different passengers. Passengers are people, and wherever x
is the same passenger as y, x is the same person as y. That is to say, pas¬
senger dominates person. But person does not dominate passenger. To be the
same passenger y o u need to satisfy not only the conditions for same person

9

Peter Geach, "1dentity," Review of Metaphysics

21, no. 1 (1967), 8-9.
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(whatever they are), but also certain conditions concerning reservations
and ticketing, fight times, destinations, and seat designations. 6a and 17c
fail to meet those additional conditions and so are the same person but
different passengers.
Passengers, however, can only fail these conditions if the conditions
are available. Consider A i r l i n e Theory M i n u s , w h i c h lacks the resources
to distinguish passengers by legal seat occupancy but is, i n every other
respect, like Airline Theory. 1ts ideology does not include any of the
familiar customer service predicates, such as "reservation," "confirmation
number," "ticket," "flight number" or "seat": i n A i r l i n e Theory M i n u s ,
the only predicates available for distinguishing passengers are those that
distinguish persons. 1n A i r l i n e Theory M i n u s , therefore, dominance is
mutual: passenger dominates person, and person dominates passenger so
that y o u have the same person if and only if y o u have the same passenger.
1n Airline Theory proper, a richer theory that includes all the standard
airline customer service predicates, person does not dominate passenger:
Airline Theory proper has the resources to distinguish passengers by dif¬
ferences i n legal seat occupancy, so that the same person may be different
passengers.
According to advocates of relative identity, enriching or impover¬
ishing the ideology of a theory does not expand or diminish its ontology.
1ntroducing a stock of customer service predicates and criteria for indi¬
viduating passengers does not bring entities of a new k i n d into existence:
passengers are just people. A n d people don't dominate: predicates do.
Dominance is a grammatical feature of predicates, like "passenger," that
marks entailment relations. 1f 6a is the same passenger as the one w h o picks
up the first bag o n BW1 Airport Carousel #3, then 6a is the same person as
that individual. Dominance depends u p o n a theory's stock of predicates
and, most importantly, o n its sortals, w h i c h convey identity criteria, that is,
shortlists of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the identity of
objects of that sort. A sortal predicate F dominates a predicate G within a
theory if the theory has predicates that figure i n the identity criteria for F
to distinguish individuals as different Fs but do not distinguish them as
different Gs.
Theology and

"Naturalness"

Some theories have the resources to distinguish the same person as
different passengers; others recognize different persons as the same
"surmen," where different men are the same surman if they have the same
surname, and a surman is a m a n w h o bears this relation to someone.
Relative identity does not adjudicate between theories: those that admit
surmen or distinguish amongst passengers w h o are the same person are
as good as any others.
10

10

The surman example is f r o m Geach. See "1dentity," 10-12.
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1ntuitively, however, some theories are more "natural" than others. So
counting by person seems to reflect distinctions i n the w o r l d as it is apart
f r o m human interests and linguistic trickery i n a way that counting by
airline-theoretic passenger or by Geachean surman does not. Merricks wor¬
ries that relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine—van 1nwagen's
i n particular—are unintuitive or "unnatural." A n d , he writes, "once we
open the door to less-than-most-natural glosses [of Trinitarian claims]
. . . there is—absent further argument—no reason to accept the relative
identity gloss as opposed to some other." Given the theological subject
matter, however, it is hard to see h o w any account of the Trinity doctrine
could be natural or intuitive. O u r intuitions arise f r o m extensive dealings
w i t h ordinary, middle-sized spatio-temporal objects, and have less pur¬
chase on other items—including abstracta and some of the extraordinary
objects of fundamental physics. G o d is i n any case sui generis. 1t should
hardly be surprising if accounts of the Trinity doctrine and other theolog¬
ical dogmas are unnatural and unintuitive: divine properties are peculiar,
and theology is speculative.
M o r e to the point, it is not clear that the specter of competing accounts
is a problem. 1n the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity we have what ap¬
pears to be an inconsistent set of propositions. 1s there some interpretation
according to w h i c h all of them come out true? 1t seems so: prima facie, rela¬
tive identity theories provide a model. 1f there are other models, so m u c h
the better. So van 1nwagen writes, "1 w i s h only to propose a way of stating
that doctrine that can be shown to be free f r o m formal inconsistency.
Whether the doctrine so stated, actually is the catholic faith (which 1 mean
to keep whole and undefiled) w i l l be a matter for further discussion."
The aim of his relative identity account is not to produce an account of the
Trinity doctrine that is natural, plausible or intuitive, or to expound the
doctrine of the Trinity that figures as an essential component of Christian
orthodoxy. The goal is just to show that the doctrine can be coherently
formulated. O n this account there is no question of h o w we know that
(Trinitarian) Person dominates Being but not vice versa i n Trinity Theory
any more than there is a question of h o w we k n o w passenger dominates
person but person does not dominate passenger i n A i r l i n e Theory: it is a
feature of Trinity Theory.
Trinity Theory, like A i r l i n e Theory, is a human creation but, like Airline
Theory, it purports to be about a state of affairs that is not "merely sub¬
jective." Airline Theory is an account of social facts that concern people
and their actions, airline seats, airline accounting systems, and social i n stitutions. Trinity Theory is an account of objective facts about divinity.
The relative identity strategy for making sense of Trinity Theory, whether
11

12

13

11

M e r r i c k s , "Split Brains and the G o d h e a d , " 7.

12

V a n 1nwagen, " A n d Yet They A r e N o t Three Gods but One G o d , " 221.

13

F o r a discussion of social facts see, e.g., John Searle, The Construction
(New York: The Free Press, 1995).
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Geachean or otherwise, does not commit one "to the v i e w that the very
existence of the divine Persons is a theory-dependent matter." Moreover,
as an articulation of Trinity Theory, the Relative 1dentity account is not
an additional Trinitarian theology on all fours w i t h various versions of
Social and Latin Trinitarianism. 1t is a way of making sense of the claim
that G o d is one Being i n three Persons, w h i c h figures i n all orthodox and
some heterodox accounts. 1t does not have anything to say about whether
Trinitarian Persons are distinct centers of consciousness, whether the H o l y
Spirit proceeds f r o m Father and Son or f r o m the Father alone, whether
the Son is equal to the Father or subordinate, whether Father, Son and
H o l y Spirit are modes or parts of a divine Being or Persons as understood
by orthodox Nicene accounts, or whether the Persons are, i n some sense,
grounded i n the Trinitarian Godhead or vice versa.
Relative identity accounts explain h o w we should understand R1 predi¬
cates within a theory. They do not provide any means for selecting amongst
theories. Trinity Theory features hypostatic predicates, including begets
and proceeds, that distinguish divine Persons but not divine Beings, so i n
Trinity Theory the Father, w h o begets the Son, and the Son, w h o is begotten,
are different Persons but the same Being. The non-Trinitarian monotheistic
theories of other Abrahamic religions do not have hypostatic predicates,
w h i c h serve to distinguish Persons, and so they recognize only one divine
Person. Relative identity accounts do not address the question whether
Trinitarian theism is theologically superior to non-Trinitarian monotheism
and are, to that extent, metaphysically innocent. The worry that the rela¬
tive identity strategy is incomplete without a "supplemental story about
the metaphysics underlying R1 relations," suggested by Michael Rea and
others, is therefore beside the point. The aim is to show that the doctrine
is logically coherent—not to produce a substantive theology or theologi¬
cally informed metaphysics. A n d that, arguably, is all that philosophers
qua philosophers can do. Relative identity accounts have nothing to say
about whether Trinity Theory cuts along the theological joints i n a way
that alternative ways of understanding supernatural reality do not. They
are theologically non-committal. A n d that, arguably, is a virtue.
14

15

Conclusion: Relative Identity

Redux

Relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine are among the most
promising attempts to make sense of the doctrine without either confounding the Persons or dividing the Essence of G o d the Trinity. O n such
accounts we hold that the Father is the same Being (or the same God) as
the Son but not the same Trinitarian Person and, consequently, that Father
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and Son have the same generically divine properties, but different specifi¬
cally hypostatic properties, w h i c h are peculiar to the Persons individually.
Merricks's dismissal of relative identity is hasty: he has not shown that
this account is a non-starter. The Fathers of the Church, w h o concerned
themselves w i t h the Doctrine of the Trinity i n the third, fourth and fifth
centuries, d i d not have the logical machinery that we have. 1f they had
then, arguably, they w o u l d have given relative identity accounts a serious
look. 1 suggest that we do likewise.
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